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 We use historical publications and – for more recent years – micro-data from the 
income tax and wealth tax returns to estimate the development in income inequali-
ty in Denmark over the last 140 years. The paper breaks new ground in treating the 
specific features of the Danish Tax system and in analysing the implications of the 
switch from joint to individual taxation. We show that income inequality have de-
clined substantially over the last century with an income share for the top 1 per 
cent dropping from 27.6 per cent from its peak in 1917 to 6.4 in 2010. However 
the decline is not simply a secular downward trend consistent with the downward 
part of a Kuznets curve. Instead there seems to be several distinct phases, inter-
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The long-run history of income inequality in Denmark is of considerable interest. Denmark is of-
ten portrayed as a country that has successfully combined economic performance with social justice. 
Certainly, in today’s terms, Denmark scores well in league tables of income inequality. In the OECD 
report, Divided we stand, Denmark has one of the lowest Gini coefficients at 24.8 per cent, to be com-
pared with 29.5 per cent in Germany and 37.8 per cent in the United States (OECD, 2011, Table A1.1). 
In the World Top Incomes Database (WTID), the share of the top 1 per cent is currently the lowest 
recorded. This leads naturally to the question whether this has always been so. Or has Denmark in the 
past brought about a significant reduction in inequality? If so, when did it take place and how was it 
achieved? 
The study of long-run trends in income inequality in Denmark is aided by the fact that the in-
come and wealth tax data provide a rich historical source. There has long been research based on the 
data on “assessed” income available in the tax records. The 1928 textbook, Den økonomiske fordeling, by 
Zeuthen contained analyses of the income and wealth distribution in the 1920s. Bjerke examined “the 
upheavals brought about by the war and the events of the early post-war years” (1957, p. 98) and went 
on to cover the period 1939-64 (Bjerke, 1965). Later studies included Egmose (1985) covering 1939-80, 
Pedersen and Smith (2000) covering 1981-96 and the series for top income shares constructed by 
Kleven and Schultz from micro-data for 1980 to 2005, included in the WTID. This paper benefits from 
these earlier investigations, and particularly from the long-run perspective taken by Sørensen (1989, 
1993), whose study covers a long period from 1903-1986. At the same time, the concept of assessed 
income used in many of these earlier studies differs from that employed in most countries (in effect, it 
deducts taxes paid in the previous year), and one of the contributions of the present paper is to esti-
mate distributions for Denmark for taxable income, which is closer to being internationally compara-
ble. 
Our overall aim in this paper is to assemble evidence about the long-run evolution of inequality 
at the top of the distribution in Denmark, with particular emphasis on its comparability over time and 
across countries. How far can the findings for different sub-periods be joined up? When did top in-
come shares fall? Is Denmark correctly ranked internationally? What can we learn from data from 1870 
to 2010 – 140 years spanning two world wars, and the Great Depression as well as the recent Financial 
Crisis? As such, it provides a long run of data comparable with those for other Nordic countries, and 
we compare our findings with those for Norway and Sweden. 
The estimates of top income shares are based on evidence from the income tax and wealth tax 
returns, using the historical publications of tabulated data and, for more recent years, micro-data. The 
sources and methods are described in Section 2, which goes into some detail into the methods used to 
arrive at taxable income and to deal with the specific, and changing, features of the Danish tax system. 
In Section 3 we present the results for top income shares. These provide a revised series of top shares 
based on population coverage and on an income concept closer to the definitions applied for other 
countries in the WTID. We examine a number of the factors that may have influenced the long-run 
evolution in Denmark, including the impact of wars, changing labour market participation, the devel-
opment of the economy, and changes in the tax system. In Section 4, we set these findings for the top 
shares in the wider context of changes in the rest of the distribution and examine the joint distribution 
of income and wealth. In Section 5 we compare the results for Denmark with those for other Nordic 
countries. The conclusions are summarised in Section 6. All the main time series in this paper can be 
found in appendix A2.  







2 Methodology and data 
In using income tax data, we are following a line of research that began in the United Kingdom 
in the nineteenth century (e.g. Baxter, 1868), was taken up in the United States when the present in-
come tax was established, developed further by Kuznets (1953), and which has recently been revived by 
Piketty (2003). A more or less standard methodology has been established, combining the tax data with 
external control totals for the total population and total income (see Atkinson and Piketty, 2007 and 
2010) in order to facilitate cross-country comparative studies.  
In this respect, the construction of the time series for Denmark benefits from a number of ad-
vantages: 
• A fairly stable tax code over a long time span: Permanent income taxation was established 
at a national level in Denmark in 1903 and this tax code remained the foundation of the in-
come tax system until the end of the 1960s, (Johansen, 2007, page 12). Since then a number 
of tax reforms have been passed with the change from family to individual taxation in 1970 
as one of the biggest. 
• Detailed income statistics have been collected by a single agency: throughout the whole pe-
riod a single statistical department (DS) – the later Statistics Denmark – was responsible 
with the collection and reporting of the income data from the tax returns. This ensured a 
stable format of the publications over long periods of time.  
• Although the data for years before 1980 are tabulated, these are quite detailed, especially in 
the early years, where the reported income distributions are close to micro-data in the top 
bracket (often down to a single individual), cf. Figure 1. For many years, there are 30 or 
more intervals. In the tables relating to income year 1920, for example, there are 30 inter-
vals and 12 taxpayers in the top interval. From 1980 the entire population of taxpayers are 
available as micro-data. 
Figure 1 
The number of tabulated intervals and individuals in the top interval 
Notes:  For the years before 1938 the “residual” interval of the non-filers is counted as an interval.  
Sources: Statistics Denmark (see Appendix Table A1) and Sørensen (1989). 
 







At the same time, there are features of the Danish income tax that differ from those in other 
countries and which complicate the analysis. For this reason, we have to devote considerable space to 
the definition of income and of the tax unit.  
Definition of income 
The income concepts applied in determining tax liability, and the income concepts reported in 
the statistics, have varied over time in a way summarised in Table 1 (drawn from Sørensen, 1989). Up 
until 1966, the tax was levied on the so-called assessed income, which due to a peculiar rule in the Dan-
ish tax legislation was given by gross income minus all direct taxes and rates paid along with more 
common deductions of certain expenses on life assurance and interest on debt. The deduction of taxes 
did not involve circularity, since the tax paid in year T was based on income and deductions in year T-1. 
The deductions included all personal taxes paid to state, municipalities and the church, so that in effect 
the tax base in year T was very close to the net-of-tax (or disposable) income in year T-1 (see Bjerke, 
1957, p. 99).  
Table 1 
Overview of the income concepts available in the tax statistics 
Period Income concept Definition 
1903-66 Assessed income Taxable income – personal taxes paid (relating to assessed 
income in previous year) 
1967- Taxable income Gross income – common deductions (interest payments, 
certain types of insurance etc.) 
= 
Assessed income + paid personal taxes 
1976- Gross income Wage income + transfers + interest + stock capital gains 
and dividends + net business income 
= 
Taxable income + common deductions 
1980- Micro-data allowing a variety of definitions in addition to the above. 
Sources: The first three rows are from Sørensen (1989, p. 63). 
 
The deductibility of paid personal taxes up to 1966 complicates the comparison of inequality in 
Denmark with that in other countries and the construction of a consistent series covering the period as 
a whole, and correcting for this so-called tax allowance is not trivial, as the individual size of the allow-
ance depends on the assessed income the year before. In what follows, we have treated it by adding 
back the estimated tax deductions per income range, using information on the tax functions. More spe-
cifically we calculate a tax payment for each taxpayer in each income interval based on the interval 
mean income and the ruling ordinary state tax rates2. As far as we know, this is the first time such an 
adjustment has been made. 
                                                 
2 The following tax codes have been applied:  
1870-1903: no correction. 1904-1909: law of 1903. 
1910-1912: law of 1909. 1913-1914: law of 1912. 
1915-1917: law of 1915. 1917-1919: law of 1917 (two laws). 
1920-1921: law of 1919. 1922-1939: law of 1922. 
1940-1945: law of 1940. 1946-1955: law of 1945. 
1956-1965: law of 1955 (taxpayers with dependents). 1966-1966: law of 1965 (taxpayers with dependents). 
 







The calculation of taxable income is only approximate for several reasons. It is based on the av-
erage income of the interval in the same year and thus takes no account of changes in income over 
time; it excludes municipal taxes, church taxes and certain other taxes such as the state wealth taxation. 
In itself, using the interval average as the tax base is likely to underestimate the average tax payment in a 
progressive tax system, and hence to understate the degree of inequality. However, operating in the 
opposite direction is the fact that individuals in the top of the distribution are more likely to have had 
relatively high income growth compared to the year before in which the tax payment were actually cal-
culated. Not being able to control for income mobility thus overestimates the size of the tax allowance 
in the top of the distribution and underestimates it in the bottom, giving a more unequal income distri-
bution3. Leaving out the wealth tax might somewhat counter this to the extent that income and wealth 
are correlated. 
The exclusion of municipal (and church) taxes affects the income share to the extent that they 
were not levied proportionally, which was indeed the case in some municipalities. E.g. the capital mu-
nicipality of Copenhagen, which introduced a modern income tax already in 1861, had in the beginning 
of the 20th century a degree of tax progression that was as high as at the state level4. However the pro-
gressivity in some municipalities reflects the large degree of autonomy that the municipalities had at the 
time to define their own system of taxation, and it is more or less impossible to say something about 
the overall progressivity at the municipality level5. For this reason we have not attempted to add back 
the municipal taxes. 
The resulting totals for taxable income are shown in Figure 2 below, together with the totals for 
assessed income and for reported income (excluding those below the tax cut-off). As may be seen, the 
removal of the tax allowance between 1966 and 1967 creates a large jump of around 17-18 percentage 
points of GFI in the total reported income (switching from assessed to taxable income). However de-
spite the crudeness of our estimates of the tax allowance, the implemented correction is more or less 
able to remove the jump in the total income, which indicates that the net effect of our correction is 
broadly correct6. The remaining part of the gap is primarily attributed to the tax allowance from the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
For the years 1937-1950 the tax rates from the 1937 Common Municipal Fund law has also been applied. For the years 
1951-1955 the tax rates from the 1956 law has been used. The tax payment for each year has further been scaled according 
to the official scaling factor (udskrivningsprocent) taken from Johansen (2007) or implied from the average tax rates report-
ed in Philip (1965, p. 119). For the laws up to and including the 1919-law a personal allowance of 800 DKK has been ap-
plied. For the laws of 1922 to 1945 we have used a personal allowance starting at 1,400 DKK (corresponding to taxpayers 
with dependents in cities outside the capital). This allowance was phased out, so that taxpayers with an income about 10,000 
DKK did not receive it. This schedule has also been applied to the Common Municipal Fund tax. For the laws of 1955 and 
1965, the personal allowance was incorporated into the tax schedule by having a zero marginal tax rate in the lowest tax 
bracket. 
 
3 Looking at that micro-data from 1980 and onwards indicates that there is indeed a large degree of mobility in the top of 
the income distribution. From 1980-90 around 23 per cent of the individuals in the top 10 per cent in a given year are not in 
the group the year after. For the top 1 per cent the number is around 29 per cent. Looking more directly at the changes in 
tax payments, the individuals in the top 10 per cent increased their average payment around 16 per cent compared to the 
same individuals the year before. For the top 1 per cent the number was 18 per cent. The increase in average taxable income 
was on average 6 per cent p.a. from 1980-90. 
4 According to the 1919-law a taxpayer in Copenhagen with an assessed income of 100,000 DKK faced a marginal tax rate 
of 18 per cent and an average tax rate of 14 per cent, while the corresponding numbers for the state tax were 19 and 6.3 per 
cent, see Johansen (2007, p. 77). 
5 Even though the government at the time of the introduction of the state income tax in 1903 tried to push the municipali-
ties toward a more uniform system with a proportional income, the local tax authorities still had the possibility of deviating 
from the assessed income by deducting or adding different amounts based on their knowledge of the situation of the specif-
ic taxpayer, see Johansen (2007, p. 71). 
6 Unfortunately there are no years in which DS reports the distribution on both income definitions. 







municipal taxes, which we assume to be proportional and thus to not affect the calculated income 
shares. The possibility of any remaining bias will be discussed in section 3.  
Figure 2 
Income totals as share of Gross Factor Income 
Notes:  The income concepts refer to the following: 
1) Reported income: The income total of the legal tax base from the DS tabulated income statistics and the mi-
cro-data from 1980. 
2) Assessed income: Reported income plus the DS’ estimates of the income below the cut-off of 800 DKK. 
From 1917-1937 the income below the cut-off has been estimated by Sørensen (1989). 
3) Taxable income: Before 1966, assessed income plus our own estimates of the allowance for ordinary state in-
come taxes (with effect from 1908). Before 1994 the taxable income series have further been adjusted for the 
grossing up of income transfers in 1994 as descripted below. 
4) Gross income: Before 1970 gross income is given by relatively crude contemporary estimates from DS in-
cluding also the income of individuals below the cut-off. Hereafter it is given by the legal gross income, which is 
collected automatically by the tax authorities.  
From 1980 the totals are taken from the micro-data, see appendix A3 for definitions. The years 1980-82 overlap 
with tabulated totals. 
Expressed as a percentage of Gross Factor Income given by Hansen (1974) (1870-1936) and DS (1937-2010).  
Sources: Statistics Denmark, Bjerke and Ussing (1957), Hansen (1974), Sørensen (1989) and own calculations. 
 
Figure 2 also shows total gross income, reported by DS for the years since 1917. This income 
concept includes adding back all deductions (not just the tax allowance) along with their estimates of 
the income below the cut-off of 800 DKK, and we should therefore expect taxable income to lie below 
this amount.  
The rest of the general setup of the historical Danish tax system to a large degree followed the in-
ternational standards at the time7, allowing deductions of items such as union subscriptions, contribu-
tions to pension and insurance schemas (unemployment, sickness, life etc.) and subtracting of personal 
                                                 
7 When drafting the original Danish tax legislation from 1903, the Danish government had primarily drawn from the Prus-
sian income tax system (the Miquelian tax law from 1891), see Johansen (2007, p. 25).  







allowances before the tax was calculated8. However as in many other countries the treatment of capital 
income deserves particular attention.  
Until the introduction of the dual tax system in 1987 the foundation of the income tax system 
was a net income concept, in which – in principal – all real income streams were to be added along with 
deductions of all cost associated with “acquiring, securing and maintaining” the income. This meant 
e.g. that imputed rents, capital gains, positive and negative interest payment and income in kind all were 
included in assessed/taxable income, while gifts, heritage, lottery premiums etc. were exempt. The only 
exemption in relations to capital gains was that they were not taxed if they had not accrued by inten-
tion. Initially this exemption mainly meant that capital gains on private homes and other personal pos-
sessions were exempt: however from 1960 capital gains for ordinary taxpayers were taxed under a spe-
cial income tax scheme first introduced in 1958, whereas capital gains in relation to a taxpayer’s liveli-
hood or speculation are taxed as regular taxable income. It is difficult to assess precisely how the tax 
authorities made the distinction, but it presumably meant that most taxpayers with capital gains were 
taxed under the special scheme.  
From 1981 the legislation was changed so that capital gains on stocks owned more the 3 years, 
which had not accrued in relation to a taxpayer’s livelihood, were generally exempt9. This rule was 
maintained until 2006, when all capital gains were made taxable, however the precise placement of 
stock income in the tax legislation changed repeatedly across the period. Until 1991 dividends were 
generally included in the taxable income, while non-exempt capital gains were taxed under the special 
income scheme mentioned above until 1993. Hereafter these incomes were taxed as stock incomes, 
which were not included in taxable income. 
As a consequence we generally interpret the series on taxable income as excluding capital gains, 
while we have a data break in 1991, when dividends were removed from the taxable income. Using the 
micro-data starting in 1980, which contain the income records of the entire population, we are able to 
add back the stock income to our income concept, however as shown in appendix A3, the removal of 
the dividends creates no visible break in the series as the reported dividends were very low before 1991 
and the reporting rules for both capital gains and dividends change continuously towards 2006 making 
it difficult to construct a consistent series over time. Similarly, the introduction of the dual tax system in 
1987 does not create a break in the series as the duality was achieved by introducing a new income con-
cept only consisting of labour income (and positive capital income) and taxing this at an extra rate. 
Public transfers such as unemployment benefits, sickness benefits and public pensions were all 
taxable and therefore included in our income concept. However before 1994 some other transfers 
(cash-benefits and supplement provisions for pensioners) were exempt10 and recipients of social pen-
sions (disability and old age pension) had an extra personal allowance, which in effect made their pen-
sion tax free. We deal with this data break by assuming that the grossing up of transfers only affects the 
income total (not the top income brackets) and take out the extraordinary growth in the total in this 
year. We do this by first regressing the growth rates of total taxable income on total labour and capital 
income (excluding 1994) and scale up the 1993 income total, so that the gross rate from 1993 to 1994 
equals the predicted value (2.7 per cent) instead of the actual (7.9 per cent). The implied increase in the 
1993 income total of 5.1 per cent is indexed to the development in the income transfers relative to 
                                                 
8 See DS Statistiske Meddelelser 1968:9 and Philip (1965 p. 126) for a detailed description of the different deductions and 
allowances and the developments in these over time. See also Danish Ministry of Taxation (2002). 
9 See Law no 295 of 10/06/1981. 
10 Most of the exempt transfers had the character of former in-kind transfers that had been monetized. 







GDP and applied to all years before 199311. In this way the income total in e.g. 1925 and 1970 is scaled 
up by 0.7 and 2.7 per cent respectively.  
With the above we obtain a “comparable” series on taxable income covering the whole century, 
and in what follows, we take this series (including the corrected assessable income before 1967) as our 
main series. Although this income concept is affected by changes in tax legislation – such as maximum 
deductions etc. – and thus not an ideal income concept, the developments in the income shares follow 
closely what we obtain by using e.g. gross income for the years 1977-2010, where we have overlapping 
data (see appendix A3, which also gives a summary of the variables used). This gives us some confi-
dence that the development measured by taxable income is also historically a good proxy for the under-
lying development in gross income. 
Tax unit 
The tax unit was initially the family, with the incomes of husbands and wives being added togeth-
er. The data refer to “principal taxpayers”, defined as unmarried persons plus married men. From 1970 
there was an important change in that the tax unit became individuals aged 15+ (some individuals be-
low 15 years also filed a tax return if they earned a sufficiently high income). However income from 
wealth was still taxed solely in the hands of the primary income earner in each family until 1983, see 
Egmose (1985, p. 55).  
The required control total for the pre-1970 period is the number of potential principal taxpayers, 
taken to be the total number of adults minus the number of married women. In the case of Denmark, 
the Statistical Yearbooks have, in many years, published figures for “skatteforhold” – or “tax condi-
tion” – giving the DS estimates of the potential taxpayers. The precise definition of this number varies 
somewhat across the period, being individuals, age 18+ minus married women before 1955 changing to 
16+ minus married women from there until the change to individual taxation in 1970. The figures for 
total tax units and total individuals are shown in figure 3. 
  
                                                 
11 We use the income transfers as percentage of GDP given by DS’ 50 year overview from 2002 back to 1948. From there 
we index with the state social of expenditures as a share of GFI. 









Notes:  The population numbers (total and divided into age groups) are taken from DS online database (tables HISB3, 
HISB4, BEF1). The number of married women from before 1970 has been interpolated based on the popula-
tions censuses, which were typically conducted with a 5 year interval. 
 For the 3 observations 1870, 1903 and 1908 the number of individuals below the cut-off of 800 DKK has been 
excluded from the number of tabulated tax units, although DS did estimate an income for them and included 
them in the tabulations. The source of the 1915 observation is the population census that year and therefore co-
vers the whole population. 
From 1980 the used population total is taken from the micro-data, see appendix A3 for definitions. The years 
1980-82 overlap with the tabulated total. 
Sources: Statistics Denmark. 
 
Despite the fact that the estimated number of potential taxpayers from most of the historical pe-
riod was given by individuals age 18+ minus married women, there were still individuals below 18 with 
their own income reporting their income to the tax authorities. Most of these were below the 800 DKK 
cut-off and thus not included in the tabulations before 1938, but an examination by DS in 1939 showed 
that in this year there were around 53,000 individuals below the age of 18 in the tabulated statistics, see 
Sørensen (1989, p. 66). Ironically, when DS changed their definition of potential taxpayers to individu-
als from age 16+, the tax legislation also changed, so that individuals below 18 living at home could 
apply for joint taxation with the family, which presumably reduced this number. 
In order to have a consistent approach over time, we have chosen the slightly broader population 
total of the age 15+ minus married women that can cover the entire period until 1970. From then on 
we use the actual number of tax units, which closely corresponds to the population of age 15+, cf. fig-
ure 3. 
Published data 
The sources of the tabulated data are set out in Appendix Table A1. There are a number of gaps, 
but the series is particularly rich for the first part of the twentieth century. For example, between 1903 
and 1939 there are 26 observations, whereas the corresponding number of years for Sweden is 10 and 
Norway it is 6. The Danish data are less strong than the Norwegian for the nineteenth century, having 
only the one observation for 1870 (whereas for Norway there are 10 observations). In what follows, we 







make use of the data for 1870, but it should be borne in mind that the long gap – a third of a century – 
means that the figures may be less comparable. 
Prior to 1938, DS only collected income assessment for families with an assessed income above 
800 DKK (more or less equivalent to the general personal allowance until 1920) leaving out 74 per cent 
of the population in 1903 decreasing to around 33 per cent from 1917 to 1937. For the years up to 
1908 DS made a contemporary estimate of the income below this threshold. For the years 1917 till 
1937 we have used the estimates of Sørensen (1989) for the lowest (omitted) interval. The typical 
amount added per tax unit is around 400 DKK. In Figure 2, the resulting estimated income of the 
families with an income below 800 DKK is given by the difference between reported and assessed in-
come. It may be seen that the addition is substantial in the years before 1920.  
Tax evasion 
The extent of tax evasion has been discussed by a number of authors. According to the estimate 
of Ussing, tax evasion was some 10-15 per cent (1953, page 231). The estimate of Egmose was similar: 
10 per cent (1985, page 48). In more recent studies, Kleven et. al. (2011) finds that the tax evasion 
(which is uncovered by audits) was 1.8 per cent in 2007-08, while tax evasion more broadly is estimated 
to constitute just below 5 per cent of the GDP, see Mogensen (2003, 2010), who also confirm the de-
clining level of evasion reported by the other authors12. Mogensen (2003) estimates that the under-
declaration at the beginning of the century was around 25 per cent. 
The presence of tax evasion of course gives rise to some caution in term of interpreting the ob-
served income distribution as the real distribution of economic resources, but it only constitutes a 
problem for our measures of the top income shares, if the evasion is somehow disproportional to re-
ported income13. For extensive discussion of the implications of tax evasion for the estimates of top 
income shares in other countries, see e.g. Alvaredo and Saez (2010). 
Interpolation 
As the tabulated income statistics in general do not correspond to the income percentiles of in-
terest, it is necessary to derive an estimate of the income distribution within each interval in order to get 
the desired percentile cut-off. In this study we use the split histogram as the interpolation method, 
which assumes that the individual incomes within an interval increase linearly from the lower to the 
upper cut-off with a kink point at the average income in the interval, see e.g. Atkinson (2005) for a de-
scription of the method. No extrapolation is made to obtain top income shares within an open upper 
interval.  
The uncertainty implied in using this method to derive a single number for the top income shares 
can be assessed by calculating the linear upper and lower bound (the global upper and lower bounds). 
The lower bound assumes no within-interval income inequality, i.e. everyone within the interval earns 
the interval mean income, while the upper bound is derived by assuming maximum within-interval ine-
                                                 
12 Despite the higher historical levels of tax evasion, one could expect that some tax-payers actually over-reported their 
income while the tax rates were still low. This due to the fact that the taxable income and tax paid were originally published 
in the local “tax books”, see Johansen (2007, p. 73), and reporting a high income could as such be associated with higher 
social prestige, easier access to credit etc. 
13 The correlation between income and tax evasion in Denmark has been studied in Mogensen (2003) and Boserup and 
Pinje (2012). Mogensen (2003, p. 271) finds that, while the share of individuals who had their reported income raised by the 
tax authorities was an increasing function of income in 1959 and 1980, the relative adjustment was a declining function, so 
that the overall tax evasion as a share of reported income was more or less constant over the income distribution. Boserup 
and Pinje (2012) find that evasion is basically uncorrelated with the part of the income that comes from 3nd parties, which 
imply that evasion is largely uncorrelated with taxable income for most taxpayers in the case of Denmark in the recent years, 
where 3rd party reporting provides the bulk of the information needed for the tax authorities.  







quality (splitting the population within each interval into two groups earning the upper and lower inter-
val cut-off respectively, while ensuring that the total incomes of the two groups still add up to the in-
terval total). As has been found in other studies, with sufficient intervals, the differences between the 
linear upper and lower bounds on the shares are small: the bounds are practically identical with an aver-
age interval around the mean split of [-0.23:+0.13] percentage points for the top 10 per cent and an 
average interval for the top 1 per cent of [-0.14:+0.07] percentage points, which testifies to the narrow-
ness of the income ranges at the top level. For a comparison of the series created with the mean split 
method with the linear upper and lower bounds, see appendix A4. 
Section summary 
Summing up the above description of the data available to our study, we basically have to deal 
with the following breaks in the data sources: 
• prior to 1938 exclusion of those with assessed income below 800 DKK;  
• 1967: Change from assessed to taxable income; 
• 1970: Change from family to individual based taxation. 
• 1994: Grossing up of certain transfers. 
In order to deal with these, we have adopted the following strategies: 
• Use external information about total income to estimate the incomes of the missing popula-
tion, building on the work of Sørensen (1989) and DS original estimates for the years 1870-
1915; 
• Make an estimate of the taxes paid for years prior to 1967, in order to arrive at a distribu-
tion of taxable income for those years; this is combined with estimates from 1980 onwards 
based on the micro-data to give a series for the distribution of taxable income covering the 
whole period. 
• Correct the income total before 1994 for the extraordinary growth created by the grossing 
up of transfers in 1994. 
It should be noted that we have made no adjustment for the shift in the tax unit in 1970, but we 
discuss below the likely consequences of this break in the series in that year. 
The series on taxable income is of course not the ideal series in relation of measuring the under-
lying development in the income inequality, as the definition of taxable income changes with changes in 
deductions etc. However, given that the fundamental structure of the Danish tax legislation stayed the 
same for most of the 20th, we believe that it gives a reasonably accurate description of the development 
in the underlying income distribution. This can be formally checked from 1977, where DS also publish 
tabulated data on gross income, and especially from 1980, from where the income records of the entire 
universe of taxpayers are available as micro-data. As shown in appendix A3 the development in gross 
income follows closely that of taxable income. 
3 Top income shares in Denmark 
Analyzing the developments in the Danish income distribution, we begin in Figure 4 with the in-
come share of the top 10, 5 and 1 per cent respectively based on the distribution of taxable income and 
covering the whole period from 1870 to 2010.  
  








Top income shares 1870-2010 
Notes:  The vertical line in 1970 indicates the change from family to individual taxation. 
Sources: Own calculations. 
 
The figure shows first of all a substantial decline in the top shares between 1870 and 1903. The 
facts that the 1870 figure was the result of a one-off tax, and that we have no evidence about the inter-
vening years, mean that the fall must be interpreted with caution. However the indication that income 
was much more unequally distributed before the 20th century is supported by Soltow (1979). He uses 
data from another one-off tax in 1789 to analyses the distribution of both income and wealth and ap-
plying his numbers to the methodology used here gives a lower bound on the top 1 per cent income 
share of around 30 per cent compared to our estimate of 19.4 per cent in 187014. 
The indications of high inequality in 1789 and 1870 are interesting because they predate the 
1890s that most historians set as the start of the industrialization in Denmark. This speaks against a 
Kuznets type of explanation for the development in inequality, where high levels of inequality only are 
a temporary phenomenon resulting from a slow movement of workers from low productive to high 
productive sectors. It also puts the decline in the 20th century into perspective. If the process to some 
extent is continuation of the trend from the 19th century, you should also look for driving factors that 
were present in both centuries. 
Going forward from 1870, it is striking that the share of the top 10 per cent fell from 54 per cent 
to 42 per cent. This fall of 12 percentage points is about the same magnitude as the rise in the share of 
the top 10 per cent that took place in the United States from 1970 to 2003. If we look within the top 10 
per cent, then the reduction was larger – around a quarter – for those in percentile groups 90 to 99. 
The share of the top 1 per cent fell by under a fifth: from 19.4 to 16.2 per cent.  
From 1903, we have a – nearly – continuous series for the top income shares of taxable income. 
This shows a rise in top shares in the First World War, and then a stepwise decline taking place firstly 
around the Second World War and secondly after the change-over to individual based taxation in 1970. 
                                                 
14 Another interesting finding in Soltow (1979) is the close connection between wealth and aristocratic titles with a majority 
of the wealthiest individuals also holding high titles within the royal court, army or central government.  







In between these periods of decline, there seems to have been a tendency to a slight reversal in the 
shares. Although the top income shares have remained relatively low in the recent years, there has been 
a tendency to rising inequality at the very top. In 2010 the share of the top 1 per cent was 6.4 per cent, 
which was its highest level over the past 30 years, although only 1 percentage point higher than in 1980. 
It is not evident that a rise of 1 percentage point in this share can be regarded as “significant”. Certainly 
the recent increase is very much smaller than in the United States, where the share of the top 1 per cent 
rose from 8.2 to 17.4 per cent over the same period. To find a share of more than 17 per cent in Den-
mark, one has to go back to the First World War.  
To sum up, the top shares in Denmark today are below those found in many other countries: the 
top 1 per cent share in 2010 was 6-7 per cent, or under half that found in the United States15. The dif-
ferent episodes that have led over the past century to this situation are discussed below. 
A contrast between the two world wars 
The difference between the changes in top Danish income shares in the First and Second World 
Wars is striking. During the First World War, the income share of the top 10 per cent increased by 11.8 
percentage points, returning it to the 1870 level. This increase can almost entirely be attributed to the 
top 1 per cent: the share of the top 1 per cent reached a staggering 27.6 per cent in 1917. In 1870, it 
had been “only” 19.4 per cent. Note also that the increase during the First World War is not a conse-
quence of a collapse of the income total. In contrary, the income total increased on average 10 per cent 
p.a. from 1908 to 1918 compared to an average increase of 6 per cent p.a. from 1903 to 1960. The de-
velopment during the Second World War is different in that the shares fell, and that the change was less 
dramatic. Measured from 1939 to 1946, the share of the top 10 per cent fell by 4.9 percentage points, 
and the share of the top 1 per cent fell from 13.5 per cent to 10.6 per cent. As this makes clear, the 
decrease in this case is also borne by the 90-99 percentiles in the distribution. 
The contrast between the two World Wars is interesting. It is true that the two situations were 
different in that Denmark managed to stay neutral during the First World War and was occupied during 
the Second World War. But during the occupation Denmark was able to maintain its own government 
with a high level of autonomy over internal affairs until 1943, and economically both episodes meant a 
large increase in aggregate demand in particular for agricultural products, while imports such as fuel and 
coal were in short supply. The economic conditions had therefore similarities. The same argument ap-
ply to an even larger degree to the case of Sweden, where the development in the top income shares 
closely followed that of Denmark, as described in section 5. 
The difference may lie in the fact that during the First World War the Danish government largely 
expected that the war would be short and was thus slow to adopt measures such as rationing and price 
and rent control. Furthermore, the unions and employer organizations had in 1911 settled on a 5 year 
collective agreement, which more or less dictated the nominal wage growth until 1916 and together 
with the inflationary pressure from the increased demand; this resulted in a large drop in real wages as 
documented by Lindberg (1921). In contrast, the potential economic consequences of the Second 
World War on the Danish economy were much better foreseen by the Danish government, which 
therefore was faster in implementing rationing, price control etc. Also the unions reacted faster and 
                                                 
15 It should be noted that the estimates of top shares for the period from 1980 differ from those of Kleven and Schultz 
(2011) in two respects: (1) their estimates limit attention to a sub-group of the population (the age group 25-55), and (2) they 
define income differently by among other things excluding transfers while they include their own estimate of the imputed 
rental value of private homes. It turns out that both differences reduce the top shares although the age restrictions account 
for most of the difference. Our calculations suggest that the combined effect is substantial. The share of the top 1 per cent 
in 1980 rises from 4.0 per cent to 5.5 per cent, and in 2003 from 4.4 per cent to 5.5 per cent 







demanded quarterly automatic wage adjustment to inflation in the collective agreement signed in March 
1941.  
The two wars thus point to the potential distributional consequences of increases in aggregate 
demand under sticky wage and sticky prices respectively. 
The effect of tax unit and women entering the labour market 
The next period of markedly declining income shares comes just after the change from family to 
individual taxation in 1970, which implied that the potential number of tax units changed from the 
number of individuals age 15+ minus married women to all individuals 15+ (some individuals below 
15+ with a sufficient income also filed a tax return.  
First, in order to assess the effect of the data break, we show in table 2 the development in the 
income shares of the top 10 and top 1 per cent around the changeover. There was an increase in the 
top income shares: rises of 2.6 percentage points for the top 10 per cent (from 30.7 in 1968 to 33.3 in 
1970) and 1.0 percentage points for the top 1 per cent (from 8.2 in 1968 to 9.2 in 1970).  
Table 2 
The effect of the change from family to individual taxation 
 Individual Family 
Per cent Top 10 per cent Top 1 per cent Top 10 per cent Top 1 per cent 
1967 38.4* 9.7* 30.3 7.8
1968 38.8* 10.1* 30.7 8.2
1970 33.3 9.2  
1971 32.3 8.2  
Notes: Families refer to age 15+ excl. married women. Individual refers to all individuals age 15+. 1969 was a “tax free 
year” and is thus excluded from the table. 
* Calculated based on the assumption that all taxpayers in the top income shares were either unmarried or mar-
ried to someone with zero income. 
Sources: Own calculations based on the series for taxable income. 
 
As explained in Atkinson (2007, p. 27), a move from families to individuals could raise or lower 
top income shares, depending on the joint distribution of the incomes of husbands and wives. If we 
assume that all individuals in the top income groups are either unmarried or married to someone with 
zero income, the change only affects the top income shares through a change in the total population, 
and we should therefore be able to remove the jump in the series by simply changing the population 
total to all individuals age 15. Doing this for the year 1968 yields an increase in the income share of 8.1 
percentage points for the top 10 per cent (from 30.7 to 38.8) and 1.9 per cent for the top 1 per cent 
(from 8.2 to 10.1), cf. table 2.  
The fact that this calculation greatly overestimates the effect of the change in tax units indicates 
that some of the families in the top income groups in 1968 had a non-negligible income from second-
ary earners, so that a given total income is now divided, tending to reduce the top shares. Although it 
could also (partly) be a behavioural response, as the change to individual taxation with progressive taxes 
gives an incentive to avoid taxation by distributing income more widely within the family, e.g. if a self-
employed person “hires” other family members. As such, with no information from the tabulated data 
on the income distribution within each family – which presumably has changed substantially over the 
century – there is no easy fix to join the series across the change in tax units. One cannot simply join 
the two series together by scaling either one of them, as the timing in the change from family to indi-
vidual taxation can have a big impact on not just the recorded level, but also the development of ine-
quality. 







This is in particular the case in connection with women entering into the labour market: see Fig-
ure 5. Under a family based system inequality may rise and fall depending on where in the income dis-
tribution women enter first and the correlation of potential earnings within the family, whereas inequal-
ity will almost always fall under individual taxation (except if the women enter with a very high wages). 
Simply joining two series by scaling across a change in the tax unit can thus give very misleading results. 
Sørensen (1989, 1993) does indeed show that the decline in inequality after 1970 is mainly is driven by a 
decline in inequality among secondary taxpayers (of whom, many were outside the labour market in the 
beginning of the period), while inequality among primary earners is stable. This implies that the effect 
of e.g. women entering the labour market depends crucially on the legal unit in the tax system. 
Figure 5 
The income share of the top 10 per cent and the female employment rate 
Notes:  The vertical line in 1970 indicates the change from family to individual taxation. The participation rate is defined 
as total participation divided by the number of women between the ages of 15-69. Before 1980 the female par-
ticipation rate is taken from various Statistical Year Books. After 1980 the series comes from DS online table 
RAS1. The early observations do for some reason not correspond completely to the number given by DS in 
their 50 year overview from 2002, but the overall development is the same.  
Sources: Own calculations and Statistics Denmark. 
 
From 1980, we can use the micro-data to examine the effect of “marrying-up” couples and 
thereby creating a tax unit comparable to the family unit from before 1970. Figure 6 shows the result-
ing top income shares for families in comparison with those from the individual distribution.  
  








Top income shares for families and individuals 
Notes:  The family distribution is constructed from the individual distribution with married couples added together.
Sources: Own calculations and Statistics Denmark. 
 
From this, we can draw two important conclusions. The first is that the impact varies across the 
distribution. The shares of the top 1 and 0.1 per cent are not greatly changed. In 2010, the share of the 
top 1 per cent is 6.5 per cent on a family basis, compared with 6.4 per cent on an individual basis. In all 
except the first 3 years between 1980 and 2010, the difference is 0.2 percentage points or less. But the 
shares of the top 5 and top 10 per cent are higher on a family basis.  The share of the top 10 per cent in 
2010 is 30.1 per cent, compared with 26.9 per cent on an individual basis. The second finding is that 
the difference has widened over time for all except the very top shares. This may be seen most clearly 
from the fact that the top 10 per cent share on a family basis is 3.7 percentage points higher in 2010 
than in 1980 compared to an increase of 1.0 percentage point on an individual basis. This demonstrates 
that the difference in the definition of the tax unit cannot be treated as simply a fixed effect. This is 
something that potentially is important to take into account when using the World Top Incomes Data-
base to do cross country analyses. 
The effect of taxation 
In the studies of France (Piketty, 2003) and of the US (Piketty and Saez, 2003) one of the key el-
ements in the analysis was the effect of rising (marginal) taxes and these authors concluded that the 
rising marginal tax rates were probably one of the reasons why top income shares did not recover after 
the Second World War, as high marginal tax rates impaired the incentive (or capacity) to accumulate 
capital at the top, thus preventing the buildup of capital concentration to the same extent as at the be-
ginning of the 20th century. 
Something similar is not possible in this study as we in general do not have information on the 
income composition in the tabulated data. We can therefore only consider the overall development in 
taxation and inequality along with the direct of taxation given by the difference between assessed in-
come (where taxes have been subtracted) and taxable income. 
As a starting point we compare in figure 7 the series on taxable income with that of assessed in-
come – the difference being paid personal taxes to state, municipality and the church. As mentioned in 







section 2 the subtraction of paid taxes affects the income shares through two channels. First of all, be-
cause the taxes are based on the assessed income the year before, the assessed income in a given year is 
in effect a weighted sum of the past taxable incomes, where the weights depend on the past average tax 
rates16, and as the overall level taxation increases income shares calculated based on assessed income 
thus become a poorer proxy of the static within-year inequality. 
Secondly taxation affects the income shares to the extent that it is not levied proportionally, while 
proportional taxation in itself does not affect the calculation of income shares. Disregarding the dy-
namic effects of the tax allowances the difference between assessed income and taxable income in fig-
ure 7 thus reflects the progressivity in the tax system. 
Figure 7 
The top income shares using taxable and assessed income 
Notes:  The pre-1967 taxable income is given by assessed income plus our own estimates of the allowance for ordinary 
state income taxes (with effect from 1908). The vertical lines indicate the two data breaks of the removal of the 
tax allowance in 1967 and the change from family to individual taxation in 1970. Both series have been adjusted 
for the grossing up of transfers as descripted above. 
Sources: Own calculations. 
 
The figure first of all illustrates the effect of our corrections for the tax allowances before 1967. 
This correction effectively removed the jumps in the series between 1966 and 1967, indicating that the 
correction – at least at the end of the period – captures the main progressivity of the tax system. 
Whether or not the corrections also capture the main developments in the progressivity from 1903 to 
1966 depends on how the progressivity at the municipal level developed during the same period. It is, 
as mentioned above, almost impossible to assess the general progressivity at the municipal level in es-
pecially the early period; however there are some indications that the rise in state progressivity came as 
a substitute for municipal progressivity17. In this case we would underestimate the income inequality at 
the beginning of the period and thus the decline towards 1967. 
                                                 
16 Assuming a constant average rate (v) the weight on income earned in year s going into assessed income in year t ≥ s is  
(-v)t - s. Further assuming a constant income stream, the assessed income converges to 1/(1 + v) × taxable income. 
17 Also the precise timing of the increases in state progressivity should be interpreted with caution as taxation in the period 
before 1967 was conducted via a number of extraordinary laws outside the ordinary state tax schedule. When these laws 
 







The overall picture in figure 7 is that the tax allowance only affected the income shares marginally 
before 1935-40 and builds up thereafter, where the effect on the top 1 per cent already from 1940 is 
stable at around 2 percentage points, while the effect on the top 10 per cent continues to increase to 4-
5 percentage points before the tax allowance is removed. This is overall in line with other evidence. 
Egmose (1985, p. 53) suggests that the effect of taxation on the income distribution was basically zero 
before 1940, a position which is supported by The Danish Economic Council (DOR) finding in their 
1967 report that the difference between measuring the maximum degree of equalization on assessed 
and gross was stable at 2-3 percentage points from 1950 to 1960 (p. 31), while the redistribution via the 
tax system were basically zero before 1940. These conclusions are based on the analyses by P. B. Olsen 
and V. Kampman; surveyed in DOR (1967, p. 43). 
A more direct picture of the rise in progressivity is shown in figure 8 that depicts the marginal tax 
rate at the income cut-off for the top 1 per cent over the last 110 years. 
Figure 8 
The income share of the top 1 per cent and the (top) marginal tax rate 
Notes:  The marginal tax rate is measured at the income cut-off for the top 1 per cent and before 1970 it takes into 
account the ordinary state taxation, the common municipal fund law (see footnote 2) and average municipal tax-
ation. The municipal average taxation (as per cent of the assessed income to the state) can be found in the statis-
tical yearbook back to 1927. These rates have been adjusted by a factor 1.25 to take into account of the fact that 
the municipalities gave larger deductions before calculating the taxable income (in 1967 and 1968 the municipal 
income tax base was only 80 per cent of that of the state). Before 1927 the average municipal tax rate has been 
assumed constant at a level of 6.6 per cent. From 1970 the marginal tax rates are published by the Ministry of 
Taxation. 
The equilibrium marginal tax rate refers to the effective marginal tax rate taking into account the effect of the 
tax allowance under the assumption of a constant income level. From 1967 the two tax rates are identical, since 
taxes paid could no longer be deducted. Until 1987 the marginal tax rate applies to basically all income types. 
After this point capital income is taxed at a lower rate. 
The vertical lines indicate the two data breaks of the removal of the tax allowance in 1967 and the change from 
family to individual taxation in 1970.  
Sources: Johansen (2007), Philip (1965), the Ministry of Taxation and own calculations. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
turned out to be needed for a long period of time, they were often incorporated into the ordinary tax schedule with some 
delay. 







Looking at the statutory tax rates, the first rise in the marginal tax rate (at this income level) came 
during the First World War and then leveled off until the mid-1930s from whereon it increased quite 
substantially until the beginning of the 1950s. However before 1967 the tax allowance created a marked 
difference between statutory and effective tax rates, because an increase in income in one year – which 
was initially taxed at the statutory marginal tax rate – reduced the tax liability the following. In effect, 
the effective marginal tax rates were typical lower than the statutory rates. 
A standard method at that time to show the effective tax rates was to calculate so-called equilib-
rium tax rates assuming a constant income. Under this assumption the marginal tax rate convergences 
to 1/(1+x) with x being the statutory marginal tax rate18. A legal marginal tax rate of e.g. 50 per cent 
thus corresponded to an equilibrium marginal tax rate of 33.3 per cent. This implied that the legal mar-
ginal tax rates could be higher than 100 per cent, which they indeed were in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Measured in this way the marginal tax rate at the top 1 per cent cut-off increased by almost a factor 4 
from around 12 per cent in the end 1920s to over 40 per cent around 1960. However it should be not-
ed that the effective marginal tax rate at the individual level in the end depended on the individual ex-
pected income in the following years and was thus highly heterogeneous. A further thing to notice is 
that the marginal tax rate at the top 1 per cent cut-off was far from the top marginal tax rate. In contra-
ry, a general feature of the Danish tax system in particular in the beginning of the 20th century was the 
large number of tax brackets going high up into the income distribution, as shown in figure 9.  
Figure 9 
The income distribution and the tax schedule in 1925 
Notes:  In 1925 ordinary state taxation followed the 1922 tax law with a scaling factor of 9/8. To arrive at the tax rate at 
the cut-off for the top 1 per cent in in figure 8, you need to add the municipal tax of 6.6 per cent.  
The spikes in the marginal tax rate between 1,000 and 10,000 indicates the phasing out of the personal allow-
ance and implies in principle an infinite local marginal tax rate. 
Sources: Johansen (2007) and own calculations. 
 
The figure shows the income distribution and the statutory tax schedule for the ordinary state in-
come tax in 1925. At this time the mean assessed income and the cut-off for being in the top 1 per cent 
                                                 
18 To see this, consider an individual with a constant income w. He faces the tax function: T() = T( w – T()), where the 
effective marginal tax rate x wrt. w is given by: x = T’(1 – x)  x = T’ / (1 + T’).  







were was around 2,100 DKK and 13,700 DKK respectively. This implied that taxpayers with an in-
come at the mean were located in the 3rd out of 21 tax brackets with a marginal state tax rate of 1.1 per 
cent and that the taxpayers at the top 1 per cent cut-off were located in the 11th tax bracket with a mar-
ginal tax rate of 8.4 per cent. As a comparison, the top marginal tax rate reached 28.1 per cent for in-
come above 1 mill. DKK – effectively only applying to one taxpayer. 
Finally, one of the potential areas, where the World Top Income Database can be used, is the 
study of the effect of taxation on economic behavior, as pioneered by Piketty et. al. (2011) and alt-
hough a formal study of this is outside the scope of this paper, the historical development in the mar-
ginal tax rate and the income share of the top 1 per cent at least do not contradict the view that mar-
ginal tax rates affect economic behavior as measured by the income share of the top 1 per cent. Look-
ing at figure 8, we can see that there is a relatively clear negative co-moment between the marginal tax 
rate at the top 1 per cent cut-off and their income share. However from a single-country study it is of 
course difficult to tell whether this is due to changes in real economic behaviour (such as hours 
worked), which reduces the overall efficiency in the economy or whether it is due to changes in rent 
seeking at the top, which primarily affects the distribution of income. Further, the negative correlation 
could be due to other variables correlated with the top marginal tax rate, such as public goods provision 
and income transfers. 
Section summary 
In this section we have considered the development of the top income shares in Denmark over 
140 years, which might be summarized as follows. 
• Today the top shares in Denmark are low by historical standards. Measured at taxable in-
come, the share of top 1 per cent was in the late 2000s around 6-7 per cent compared to 
around 16 per cent at the beginning of the last century and as high as 28 per cent during the 
First World War. 
• There have therefore been periods with significant falls: possibly in the last 30 years of the 
nineteenth century, and definitely over the Second World War, and in the 1970s with some 
tendencies to reversal in between and since the middle of the 1990s. 
• We have suggested that economic conditions may contribute to the explanation of the 
changes in top shares over time, notably the impact of increased labour force participation 
after 1970, and – more speculatively - the different movements in wages and prices in the 
First and Second World Wars. 
• The choice of unit of analysis – individuals versus couples – can affect measured inequality 
(although in the case of Denmark not the very top shares) to a differing extent over time, 
and hence influence the conclusions drawn about trends over time.   
• The analysis has highlighted the need to understand the role of taxation when interpreting 
the results, with the Danish pre-1967 system having the effect of reducing the degree of 
progression. The impact of marginal tax rates needs to be explored further, but the changes 
seem consistent with top income shares depending negatively on the top marginal tax rates, 
which have followed an inverted U-shape over the century.  
4 Setting the top shares in context: the evolution of the overall distribution and 
the joint distribution with wealth 
How do the changes in top shares relate to what was happening to the overall distribution? Did 
the changes reflect the changing composition of overall personal incomes? In this section, we examine 
which income groups gained as the top income shares fell, and investigate the joint distribution of in-
come and wealth. 







The overall income distribution 
The recent focus on top income shares – instead of broader measures of inequality – stems from 
the fact that most early income tax systems only covered the very top of the income distribution. In 
contrast to these studies, the Danish data have extended well down the income scale for the much of 
the last century. These data have been employed by earlier researchers to examine overall inequality, 
and in this section we follow in their footsteps, taking the story up to 2010. 
The coverage of the income tax data is summarized in Figure 10 in terms of three variables: (a) 
the proportion of the population, F, for whom we have effective income data (those above the income 
cut-off for inclusion in the tabulation), (b) the share, Ω, of income attributable to this group (calculated 
from the control total), and (c) the starting value of income, y, for those covered, expressed as a frac-
tion of the mean income. 
Figure 10 
Coverage of the income tax data 
Notes:  The vertical line indicates the change from family to individual taxation in 1970.
Sources: Own calculations. 
 
It may e.g. be seen that in 1903 the data covered only 26 per cent of the total tax units in Den-
mark, even if they received 63 per cent of the total income. The excluded group were essentially those 
with less than mean income (y was close to 1). This means that any measure of overall inequality is like-
ly to be surrounded by considerable uncertainty. From figure 10 we can further see that we can say 
nothing about the bottom third before 1938. As a result, we only report the decile shares for those 
groups covered by the tax data. It should also be noted that from 1938 the statistics are assumed by DS 
to cover all those with income, so that Ω in the above calculation is zero.  
For a broad measure of income equality such as the Gini coefficient a lower bound for the con-
tribution of the excluded group is given by assuming that they all receive the same income, (1-Ω)/(1-F), 
expressed relative to the mean, and an upper bound is obtained by assuming that they were divided 
between two groups, one receiving zero and the other receiving the maximum, y. The difference, equal 
to (1-Ω)×[1-F-(1-Ω)/y], provides a measure of the maximum possible margin of error. For 1903, this is 
quite large – around 14.1 percentage points – but from 1915 the difference is generally below 2 per-
centage points. Using the same technique to calculate the upper and lower bounds for the contribution 







to the Gini coefficient from each tabulated interval, one can calculate the overall bounds on the Gini 
coefficient. In 1903 the difference between the two bounds is 14.2 indicating that the bulk of the uncer-
tainty comes from the excluded group. 
Figure 11 shows the Gini coefficients (with upper and lower bounds) for the entire period cov-
ered. In considering these figures, it is important to bear in mind the change in 1970 from a family to 
an individual basis and the grossing up of transfers in 1994 marked by the vertical lines in Figure 11). 
Even allowing for the break, it is clear that the Gini coefficient has fallen substantially in Denmark over 
the past century. Moreover, it is clear that there is not a secular downward trend. Denmark is not simp-
ly on the downward part of a Kuznets curve. There seem in fact to be several distinct phases, interleav-
ed with periods of stability. There was, for example, little overall change from 1920 to 1939. Nor was 
there significant change from 1950 to the mid-1960s, where we take as a rule of thumb a 3 percentage 
point change as “significant”. By the same criterion, the rise in the Gini coefficient from 1994 to 2010 
of 3.2 percentage points was significant. 
Figure 11 
The Gini coefficient for taxable income 
Notes:  The first vertical line indicates the change from family to individual taxation in 1970, the second the grossing up 
of transfers in 1994. The top income series have been adjusted for the latter data break by assuming that the 
grossing up only affected the income total as described above. Something similar is not possible for the Gini co-
efficient. 
Sources: Own calculations. 
 
The Gini coefficients in Figure 11 may appear high in relation to the 24 per cent for the late 
2000s cited at the outset of the paper, an estimate that was also based on register data. It should how-
ever be borne in mind that there are three important differences in definition. First, the figures dis-
cussed above refer to taxable income, whereas the 24 per cent refers to disposable income; secondly, 
the 24 per cent figure relates to the combined income of the family, whereas the taxable income esti-
mates since 1970 relate to individual income; thirdly, the 24 per cent refers to income allowing for dif-
ferences in family size, applying an equivalence scale, whereas the estimates in this paper make no such 







adjustment19. However the estimated increase of 2.6 percentage points in the Gini coefficient between 
2002 and 2010 shown in Figure 11 is very close to the 3 percentage point change shown in the EU-
SILC statistics for Denmark20. 
The general picture from this exercise is that the development in the Gini coefficient coincides 
closely with that of the top income shares. This supports the presumption that the top income shares 
give a good indication of the development in the overall inequality, when data for broader inequality 
measured are unavailable. Of course, the Gini coefficient is just an aggregated measure of income ine-
quality and it is thus no more able than the top income shares to shed light on where in the income 
distribution the equalization took place – e.g. whether the income mass from the decline in the top 
income shares went to the middle or bottom of the income distribution. We therefore in table 3 show 
incomes shares for the top six income decile groups along with the sum of the bottom four. 
Table 3 
Income deciles 1915-2010 
Tax unit: Family Individual 
 1915 1920 1935 1950 1965 1975 1990 2000 2010
D1-D4 13.5 8.9 10.5 13.6 12.5 11.5 17.1 17.6 15.9
D5 4.5 5.0 5.3 6.7 6.6 6.3 7.7 8.1 8.1
D6 4.8 6.8 6.7 8.5 8.6 8.9 9.6 9.5 9.5
D7 6.4 9.2 8.7 10.4 10.8 11.9 11.4 11.1 11.1
D8 9.1 12.4 11.9 12.6 13.5 14.4 13.3 12.8 13.0
D9 13.1 16.6 16.6 16.1 17.2 17.5 15.8 15.3 15.6
D10 48.5 41.1 40.2 32.2 30.9 29.5 25.1 25.7 26.9
Notes:  The income deciles have been calculated based on taxable income. The deciles before 2000 have been corrected 
for the grossing up of transfers in 1994 assuming that it only affected the D1-D4 deciles. This is of course a 
stronger assumption than that it only affected the D1-D9 used above. 
Sources: Own calculations. 
 
What is interesting in this table is that with the exception of 1915-20 the reduction of the income 
share in the top was broadly distributed to the rest of the income distribution. As such the income 
share in the bottom D1-D4 increased by 3.6 percentage points from 1920 to 1965, while the increase 
for D5-D9 was 6.6 percentage points.  
This pattern points to a number of conclusions. First of all it appears to be that the decline in the 
top income shares is not simply a result of increasing income transfers. You could suspect that because 
we only have data on taxable income including transfers, the declining inequality simply capture the 
build-up of the welfare state with increasing transfers. However in this case, you would expect to see 
that the reduction of the top income primarily went to the bottom of the distribution, which was in 
general not the case and especially not consistent with the reversal of the increase in the share of the 
bottom half between 1950 and 1965. This is not to say that there was no effect on the income distribu-
tion of increasing transfers, but some of it appears to have been countered by other effects, such as e.g. 
increases in life expectancy (creating more elderly with relatively low income for a given retirement age) 
                                                 
19 Some idea of the possible magnitude of the difference may be seen from the estimates for the UK. For 1970, the UK 
Gini coefficient for the taxable income of families derived from tax records was 38.5 per cent, for after tax income was 33.9 
per cent, and for equalised family disposable income derived from a family survey was 25.9 per cent (source Royal Commis-
sion on the Distribution of Income and Wealth, 1979, Tables A.1 and A.3, and website of Institute for Fiscal Studies). 
20 These estimates, which start from 2002, are downloaded from the Eurostat website, where it should be noted that the 
income year is one year before the survey year. 







and increases in enrolment rates into higher education (creating more students with temporary low 
earnings). Secondly the increase in the income shares of the D5-D9 indicates that the decline in ine-
quality is driven by declining inequality among individuals on the labour market21.  
In the first decade of the 21st century, the top shares increased largely at the expense of decile 
groups D1-D4. For the groups D5-D8 the changes in income shares were 0.1 percentage points or less. 
The top decile group gained 1.2 percentage points and D9 gained 0.3, whereas D1-D4 lost 1.7 percent-
age points.  
The joint distribution of wealth and income 
Even though the data from before 1980 do not allow us to analysis the income composition 
within the different income groups, we do have the possibility to analysis the (joint) distribution of 
wealth and income, which – given some assumptions about the rate of return – can give an indication 
of the importance of capital income. 
In this analysis we start by comparing our series for the income share of the top 1 per cent with 
the top 1 per cent wealth share (ranked by their wealth) constructed for Denmark by Alvaredo et. al. 
(forthcoming). This comparison shows that the wealth concentration by and large followed the devel-
opment in the income concentration, cf. figure 12, with a type of stepwise declines over the 20th centu-
ry. However it is interesting to note that the large increase in income inequality during the First World 
War did not result in a subsequent increase in the wealth concentration.  
  
                                                 
21 Various authors (Bjerke, 1957, Sørensen, 1989 have found that there has been a considerable equalization within different 
industries, while changes in the industry composition have tended to increase inequality (workers have moved from indus-
tries with initially low within-industry inequality to industries with initially high inequality). 








The top 1 per cent income and wealth share 
Notes:  The top shares for income and wealth are calculated separately, i.e. taxpayers are re-ranked for each calculation. 
The estimates from Alvaredo et. al. (forthcoming) are family based throughout. The wealth share estimates from 
the micro-data have three major data breaks: 
1983: Change from family to individual taxation. 
1987: Firm equity for self-employed is included in the taxable wealth. 
1997: The wealth tax is abolished, which affects the reporting of wealth to DS – both because wealth is no long-
er subject to self-reporting and because the abolition changed the incentive to avoid taxation by placing wealth 
in special assets.  
Note also that the wealth data generally excluded wealth held in pension funds and that real estate is included at 
the public valuation, which in recent decades in general has been lower than actual estate prices.   
Sources: Alvaredo et. al. (forthcoming), Statistics Denmark and own calculations. 
 
One interpretation of this could be that the top income earners during the First World War were 
taxpayers with relatively low initial wealth and their accumulation thus deflated the wealth share of the 
top 1 per cent wealth holders. In other words, the war created a new set of rich taxpayers. Some evi-
dence on this can be found by examine the joint distribution of wealth and income shown in figure 13, 
where the joint distribution is given by wealth-to-income ratios with individuals ranked according to 
their taxable income. These numbers can be calculated by cross-tabulations of income and wealth avail-
able for a number of years in the first half of the 20th century as well as from the micro-data from 1980. 
Unfortunately the cross-tabulations only cover the very top of the income distribution and we therefore 
here focus on the top 1 and 0.1 per cent. 
  








The joint distribution of income and wealth 
Notes:  Taxpayers are ranked according to their taxable income. See figure 12 for a description of the data breaks.
Sources: Statistics Denmark and own calculations 
 
As the figure shows the wealth-to-income ratio for the top 1 per cent is halved from 1908 to 
1915 with a drop from ratio 10.5 to 5.6. Of this, the rise in the income share in itself explains around 
half as the income share of the top 1 per cent increased by 50 per cent from 1908 to 1915. There is in 
other words some indication that the war brought a new set of people with relatively low wealth to the 
top of the income distribution. 
A second explanation for the lack of translation of the increase in income inequality into wealth 
inequality is the conduct of tax policy of the time. During the war the government found itself in need 
of extra funds to fend off some of social problems created by the rapid rise in prices and to maintain a 
larger army to defend the Danish neutrality. One of the revenue sources for this was the introduction 
of a tax on income growth with rates as high as 35 per cent22, cf. Johansen (2007, p. 31). Despite the 
increases in the ordinary tax in 1915 and 1917, the tax on income growth collected more than double 
the revenue of the ordinary state tax for most years during the war. In effect this policy made it more 
difficult for newly high earning taxpayers to accumulate wealth compared to the existing. 
After the First World War we have only information on the top 0.1 per cent income taxpayers, 
but this shows that the wealth-to-income ratio recovered around half of the drop that had accrued dur-
ing the war and stayed there until the middle of the 1930s. From thereon it declined around 15 per cent 
towards the Second World War. 
From 1938 and until 1980 we have a gap in the data series and we can thus not say anything 
about the wealth to income ratios in the interim period, besides that the ratio for the top 0.1 per cent 
drops from around 8 to around 6 over the 40 years. However one has firstly to keep in mind that the 
income tax system was changed to an individual basis in 1970, while the wealth tax system did not 
change until 1983. This latter change however does not create a visible break in the series in figure 13. 
                                                 
22 Contrary to the ordinary state tax, the tax on income growth was not added to the tax allowance. 







Secondly, that real estate is included at the public valuation, which in recent decades in general has been 
lower than actual estate prices. 
5 Comparison with Norway and Sweden 
In this section, we compare the top income shares in Denmark with those in Norway and Swe-
den. For this purpose, we take the series as a whole, making no adjustment for the shift in tax unit in 
1970, as the same issue arose for the other countries. In the case of Sweden, Roine and Waldenström 
(RW) take the adult population aged over 15 minus married women (as here) up to 1950, and from 
1971 they take the adult population. These estimates are therefore comparable. The difference lies in 
that for the intervening period, from 1951 to 1970, RW deduct a proportion of married women, to 
represent those not in paid work, where this proportion declined over time. In contrast, in the case of 
Norway, Aaberge and Atkinson (AA) have used throughout the total number of adults. All series ex-
clude capital gains. 
 The series for the three countries are shown in figure 14 and 15. At first sight, there are remark-
able resemblances, however in order to explore this further, it is helpful to consider three sub-periods. 
The first is the period before 1914, when the data for Denmark and Sweden are relatively sparse: three 
observations for Denmark, four for Sweden, compared with seventeen for Norway. It is difficult to 
compare across different years, but for the one year when we have estimates for each country (1903) 
the share of the top 1 per cent in Denmark at 16.2 per cent is much lower than in Sweden, where it is 
27.0 per cent. The estimate for Norway, on the other hand, is fairly close at 19.5 per cent (a difference 
that may be due to the use of a different control total for population). It is also the case that the 1907 
estimate for Sweden is much lower, at 21.5 per cent. 
Figure 14 
Top 1 per cent income shares in the Scandinavian Countries 
Sources: Own calculations, Aaberge and Atkinson (2010) and Roine and Waldenström (2010) collected from the WTID.
 
The second period is from 1914 to 1945. Here we can say little about Norway, as we have only 
two observations. For Sweden and Demark there is now an initial striking similarity, with the top 1 per 
cent share rising sharply in the First World War to reach 27-28 per cent in both countries. There was 
then a sharp fall after the war, and, although the Swedish data are sparser, the figures for 1930 are close 







at 13-14 per cent. In the beginning of the 1930s, the top shares appear to be falling in Sweden, but ris-
ing (by about 1 percentage point for the top 1 per cent) in Denmark. There is more evidence of a fall in 
Denmark than in Sweden during the Second World War, but there is no sign of a rise in Sweden. 
Figure 15 
Top 10 per cent income shares in the Scandinavian Countries 
Sources: Own calculations, Aaberge and Atkinson (2010) and Roine and Waldenström (2010) collected from the WTID.
 
From 1948, there are almost complete series for all three countries. In the late 1940s and early 
1950s, the share of the top 1 per cent fell in Sweden and Norway, leaving Denmark with a higher share 
until around 1990, although the difference began to narrow in the mid-1970s. For the top 10 per cent, 
the shares were consistently lower in Sweden; Denmark and Norway interchanged positions but by 
1990, the share was some 2.5 percentage points higher in Denmark. From 1990, the top shares rose in 
Norway (where the spikes reflected changes in tax policy) and Sweden, and in recent years the shares of 
both the top 1 and top 10 per cent are similar in all three countries.  
6 Conclusions 
This paper has been concerned with the long-run development of income inequality in Denmark 
with particular reference to top income shares. To this end, we have constructed a new long-run top 
income series, paying particular attention to the consistency of the estimates over time and to the 
breaks in the series. We have also considered the overall distribution of income and the relation be-
tween income and wealth. 
Using the constructed time series, it is possible to give some answers to the questions posed at 
the outset. There have been periods in the past when Denmark has seen significant reductions in top 
income shares: (possibly) in the last 30 years of the nineteenth century spanning the start of the indus-
trialization in Denmark, and definitely over the Second World War, and in the 1970s. Where we have 
evidence covering the rest of the income distribution, it appears that the reduction of the income share 
in the top was broadly distributed to the rest of the income distribution. The income share in the bot-
tom four decile groups increased by 3.6 percentage points from 1920 to 1965, while the increase for the 
next five decile groups was 6.6 percentage points. There have also been periods when top shares have 
increased: notably during the First World War, and in recent years. At the same time, the recent in-







crease is modest (some 1 percentage point) and top income shares in Denmark, which are now similar 
to those in Norway and Sweden, remain low by international standards. In contrast, the rise in overall 
inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, in recent years is a significant one: more than 3 percent-
age points from 1994 to 2010, implying that the lower parts of the income distribution have become 
more unequal.  
The causes of the falls and rises in top income shares are open to debate, but we have highlighted 
notably the impact of increased labour force participation after 1970, and – more speculatively - the 
effect of differing movements in wages and prices in the First and Second World Wars. There is some 
indication that the First World War brought a new set of people with relatively low wealth to the top of 
the income distribution. We have discussed the role of taxation. The impact of marginal tax rates needs 
to be explored further, but the changes seem consistent with top income shares depending negatively 
on the top marginal tax rates, which have followed an inverted U-shape over the century. These mech-
anisms largely apply to the 20th century and we may therefore miss some important points if the declin-
ing inequality throughout the 20th century is simple a continuation of a trend from the 19th.  
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Appendix A1: Sources of tabulated income tax data 
Table A1 
Sources of tabulated income tax data 
Year Tax year Source 
1870  SM 11.1873 (main) 
ST Litra E, No 4, Table I 
V. Falbe-Hansen og Will. Scharling, DS bind IV 
1903* 1904-05 ST Litra E, No 4, Table I + VI 
1908 1909-10 ST Litra E, No 7, Table I 
1915 Population census ST Litra A, 14 Table p. 24 + Table 2 in annex  
1917* 1918-19 SM 4.57.7 Table 3 
1918* 1919-20 SM.4.59.6 Table 3  
1919* 1920-21 SM 4.61.6 Table 3 
1920* 1921-22 SM 4.65.2 Table 3 
1921* 1922-23 SM 4.67.5 Table 3  
1922* 1923-24 SM 4.70.2 Table 3 
1923* 1924-25 SM 4.72.2 Table 3 + 5  
1924* 1925-26 SM 4.75.2 Table 3 + 5 
1925* 1926-27 SM 4.77.4 Table 3 + 5 
1926* 1927-28 SM 4.79.2 Table 3 + 5 
1927* 1928-29 SM 4.82.4 Table 3 + 5 
1928* 1929-30 SM 4.84.5 Table 3 + 5 
1929* 1930-31 SM 4.87.5 Table 3 + 5 
1930* 1931-32 SM 4.90.3 Table 3 + 5 
1931* 1932-33 SM 4.92.5 Table 3 + 5 
1932* 1933-34 SM 4.95.2 Table 3 + 5 
1933* 1934-35 SM 4.97.2 Table 3 + 5 
1934* 1935-36 SM 4.99.4 Table 3 + 5 
1935* 1936-37 SM 4.103.3 Table 3 + 5 
1936* 1937-38 SM 4.106.6 Table 3 + 5 
1937* 1938-39 SM 4.108.2 Table 3 + 5 
1938 1939-40 SM 4.110.2 Table 3 + 5 
1939 1940-41 SM 4.112.4 Table 1 + 2 in annex 
1940 1941-42 SM 4.115.2 Table 1 + 2 in annex 
1941 1942-43 SM 4.119.2 Table 1 + 2 in annex 
1942 1943-44 SM 4.121.4 Table 1 + 2 in annex 
1943 1944-45 SM 4.124.3 Table 1 + 2 in annex 
1944 1945-46 SM 4.127.2 Table 1 + 2 in annex 
1945 1946-47 SM 4.131.3 Table 1 + 2 in annex 
1946 1947-48 SM 4.134.2 Table 1 + 2 in annex 
 






Table A1 – continued 
Sources of tabulated income tax data 
Year Tax year Source 
1947 1948-49 SM 4.138.2 Table 1 + 2 in annex 
1948 1949-50 SM 4.142.2 Table 1 + 2 in annex 
1949 1950-51 SM 4.146.2 Table 1 + 2 in annex 
1950 1951-52 SM 4.150.2 Table 1 + 2 in annex 
1951 1952-53 SM 4.153.2 Table 1 + 2 in annex 
1952 1953-54 SM 4.159.2 Table 1 + 2 in annex 
1953 1954-55 SM 4.161.2 Table 1 + 2 in annex 
1954 1955-56 SM 4.165.2 Table 1 + 2 in annex 
1955 1956-57 SM 4.168.2 Table 1 + 2 
1956 1957-58 SA 1958 Table 296 + SM 4.171.2, Table 1B + 2B 
1957 1958-59 SA 1959 Table 304 
1958 1959-60 SA 1960 Table 296 
1959 1960-61 SA 1961 Table 307  
1960 1961-62 SA 1962 Table 316 
1961 1962-63 SA 1963-64 Table 325 
1962 1963-64 SM 1968.4 Table 2 
1963 1964-65 SM 1969.4 Table 6 
1964 1965-66 SM 1969.4 Table 2 
1965 1966-67 SM 1970.15 Table 6B 
1966 1967-68 SM 1970.15 Table 2A 
1967 1968-69 SM 1971.9 Table 2A 
1968* 1969-70 SM 1970.2 Table 1 (only frequencies) 
1969 Tax free year  
1970 1970 ST 1973.3 Table 3 + 4 
1971 1971 ST 1974.3 Table 2A + 2B 
1972 1972 SA 1976 Table 376 + ST 1975.4 Table 2A + 2b 
1973 1973 SA 1977 Table 346 + ST 1975.9 Table 3B+ 4B 
1974 1974 SA 1977 Table 346 + ST 1976.4 Table 7A + 7B 
1975 1975 SA 1977 Table 346 + ST 1977.6 Table 4A + 4B 










Table A1 – continued 
Sources of tabulated income tax data 
Year Tax year Source 
1977 1977 ST 1979.4 Table 10 
1978 1978 ST 1980.6 Table 10 
1979 1979 ST 1981.2 Table 10 
1980 1980 ST 1982.5 Table 10 
1981 1981 I&F 1981 Table 10 
1982 1982 I&F 1982 Table 10 
Notes: * indicates that we for that year also have relied on estimates by Sørensen (1989). Typically for the income in the 
lowest interval. However for 1903 we have used his estimates to split the income for the taxpayers with an in-
come above 6,000 DKK into 4 additional subgroups (the cut-off for the top 1 per cent in 1903 was 5,400 
DKK). From 1968 the tabulated data only contain the number of taxpayers within each interval and we have in-
stead used Sørensen’s estimates for the interval mean income. For 1976 we have used Sørensen’s estimates to 
combine the data from ST10 1980 p. 88-89 with the finer tabulated frequencies in ST 1978.7 Table 10. 
Abbreviations: 
 DS Statistics Denmark, Copenhagen, Denmark (www.dst.dk). 
ST Statistiske Tabelværk (available at DS’ library, Copenhagen, Denmark). 
SM  Statistiske Meddelelser (available at DS’ library, Copenhagen, Denmark). 
 SA Statistisk Årbog (available online: http://www.dst.dk/aarbogsarkiv). 
 I&F Indkomst og Formue (available at DS’ library, Copenhagen, Denmark). 






















1870 1,189,173 880,991 139,446 880,991
1900 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
1901 1,616,400 1,194,956 #N/A #N/A
1902 1,636,800 1,208,851 #N/A #N/A
1903 1,656,100 1,221,647 314,246 1,221,647
1904 1,675,100 1,234,142 #N/A #N/A
1905 1,694,200 1,246,738 #N/A #N/A
1906 1,717,200 1,263,233 #N/A #N/A
1907 1,737,300 1,276,828 #N/A #N/A
1908 1,757,900 1,290,924 365,968 1,290,924
1909 1,781,700 1,308,219 #N/A #N/A
1910 1,805,700 1,325,715 #N/A #N/A
1911 1,829,800 1,343,310 #N/A #N/A
1912 1,856,100 1,358,580 #N/A #N/A
1913 1,879,600 1,371,050 #N/A #N/A
1914 1,905,500 1,385,920 #N/A #N/A
1915 1,934,600 1,403,990 603,004 1,403,990
1916 1,969,600 1,427,960 #N/A #N/A
1917 2,002,500 1,449,829 611,865 1,449,829
1918 2,036,300 1,472,599 694,412 1,472,599
1919 2,068,200 1,493,469 916,249 1,493,469
1920 2,104,200 1,518,439 1,042,672 1,518,439
1921 2,246,600 1,649,809 1,037,264 1,649,809
1922 2,284,100 1,676,222 1,050,447 1,676,222
1923 2,318,600 1,699,634 1,083,361 1,699,634
1924 2,353,400 1,723,347 1,138,744 1,723,347
1925 2,390,500 1,749,359 1,165,748 1,749,359
1926 2,428,800 1,776,572 1,149,092 1,776,572
1927 2,461,200 1,797,884 1,125,946 1,797,884
1928 2,491,200 1,816,797 1,127,628 1,816,797
1929 2,521,200 1,835,709 1,162,505 1,835,709
1930 2,550,000 1,853,422 1,188,456 1,853,422
1931 2,582,100 1,871,025 1,153,026 1,871,025
1932 2,620,300 1,894,728 1,088,814 1,894,728
1933 2,656,000 1,915,931 1,148,186 1,915,931
1934 2,694,200 1,939,634 1,225,533 1,939,634
1935 2,729,000 1,959,937 1,286,568 1,959,937
1936 2,770,500 1,987,043 1,328,102 1,987,043
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1937 2,805,600 2,007,749 1,377,663 2,007,749
1938 2,836,300 2,024,056 1,807,364 2,024,056
1939 2,868,900 2,042,262 1,838,649 2,042,262
1940 2,903,700 2,062,668 1,859,248 2,062,668
1941 2,926,000 2,071,062 1,885,716 2,071,062
1942 2,955,900 2,087,055 1,911,003 2,087,055
1943 2,985,400 2,102,649 1,938,836 2,102,649
1944 3,015,700 2,119,042 1,958,858 2,119,042
1945 3,039,500 2,128,936 1,982,614 2,128,936
1946 3,060,400 2,134,315 2,014,435 2,134,315
1947 3,075,800 2,134,194 2,030,498 2,134,194
1948 3,093,300 2,136,174 2,045,151 2,136,174
1949 3,113,300 2,140,653 2,054,878 2,140,653
1950 3,137,300 2,149,132 2,089,810 2,149,132
1951 3,155,200 2,157,853 2,097,172 2,157,853
1952 3,174,400 2,167,874 2,110,676 2,167,874
1953 3,197,000 2,181,295 2,127,762 2,181,295
1954 3,224,800 2,199,916 2,147,809 2,199,916
1955 3,249,200 2,215,137 2,161,827 2,215,137
1956 3,271,700 2,228,457 2,153,326 2,228,457
1957 3,291,100 2,238,678 2,165,455 2,238,678
1958 3,318,200 2,256,599 2,181,340 2,256,599
1959 3,356,300 2,285,520 2,213,213 2,285,520
1960 3,402,800 2,322,841 2,220,770 2,322,841
1961 3,447,600 2,356,797 2,256,399 2,356,797
1962 3,498,200 2,396,554 2,288,963 2,396,554
1963 3,543,400 2,430,910 2,287,429 2,430,910
1964 3,581,300 2,457,967 2,310,578 2,457,967
1965 3,613,200 2,479,023 2,335,931 2,479,023
1966 3,641,200 2,495,423 2,355,794 2,495,423
1967 3,668,200 2,510,823 2,380,214 2,510,823
1968 3,698,100 2,529,123 2,395,790 2,529,123
1969 3,724,700 2,544,123 #N/A #N/A
1970 3,757,300 2,565,123 3,833,346 3,833,346
1971 3,804,135 2,600,358 3,889,483 3,889,483
1972 3,827,988 2,618,333 3,944,423 3,944,423
1973 3,857,935 2,651,757 4,064,136 4,064,136
1974 3,887,730 2,687,390 3,959,514 3,959,514
1975 3,908,751 2,711,956 3,982,830 3,982,830
1976 3,924,109 2,733,669 4,020,502 4,020,502
 
 
Table A2  – continued 
















1977 3,947,383 2,763,048 4,058,633 4,058,633
1978 3,977,050 2,795,870 4,112,026 4,112,026
1979 4,009,135 2,835,326 4,148,024 4,148,024
1980 4,040,634 2,875,270 4,104,271 4,104,271
1981 4,069,119 2,915,640 4,133,937 4,133,937
1982 4,098,841 2,959,315 4,158,752 4,158,752
1983 4,124,161 2,999,081 4,179,597 4,179,597
1984 4,142,755 3,029,489 4,197,772 4,197,772
1985 4,160,393 3,056,611 4,229,858 4,229,858
1986 4,181,143 3,085,278 4,243,392 4,243,392
1987 4,206,840 3,116,986 4,271,674 4,271,674
1988 4,227,970 3,143,803 4,298,507 4,298,507
1989 4,240,474 3,161,858 4,310,761 4,310,761
1990 4,254,852 3,182,671 4,326,341 4,326,341
1991 4,272,839 3,204,705 4,326,943 4,326,943
1992 4,287,181 3,220,252 4,338,304 4,338,304
1993 4,298,051 3,232,659 4,348,857 4,348,857
1994 4,307,391 3,244,962 4,356,649 4,356,649
1995 4,314,802 3,251,991 4,362,788 4,362,788
1996 4,331,347 3,264,485 4,375,910 4,375,910
1997 4,338,174 3,267,298 4,383,441 4,383,441
1998 4,342,672 3,269,929 4,386,982 4,386,982
1999 4,345,934 3,270,766 4,390,883 4,390,883
2000 4,348,872 3,271,310 4,395,071 4,395,071
2001 4,354,699 #N/A 4,401,791 4,401,791
2002 4,363,151 #N/A 4,420,728 4,420,728
2003 4,370,461 #N/A 4,430,778 4,430,778
2004 4,380,062 #N/A 4,442,534 4,442,534
2005 4,393,259 #N/A 4,457,918 4,457,918
2006 4,411,580 #N/A 4,477,839 4,477,839
2007 4,432,931 #N/A 4,502,002 4,502,002
2008 4,465,874 #N/A 4,533,914 4,533,914
2009 4,503,365 #N/A 4,573,664 4,573,664
2010 4,533,420 #N/A 4,603,096 4,603,096
Notes: Number of adults = age 15+, Number of families = age 15+ minus married women.
Sources: The number of adults is taken from DS online database (tables HISB3, HISB4, BEF1). The number of married 
women from before 1970 has been interpolated based on the populations censuses, which were typically con-
ducted with a 5 year interval. These are available in various DS statistical yearbook. The number of tax returns is 
taken from the tabulated data, the statistical yearbooks or – from 1980 – the micro-data. The source of the 1915 











Income totals (Mill. DKK) 
  Reported income Assessed income Taxable income GFI
1870 241 374 375 669
1900 #N/A #N/A #N/A 1,322
1901 #N/A #N/A #N/A 1,372
1902 #N/A #N/A #N/A 1,396
1903 601 954 956 1,462
1904 #N/A #N/A #N/A 1,479
1905 #N/A #N/A #N/A 1,558
1906 #N/A #N/A #N/A 1,627
1907 #N/A #N/A #N/A 1,739
1908 1,054 1,054 1,067 1,773
1909 #N/A #N/A #N/A 1,828
1910 #N/A #N/A #N/A 1,922
1911 #N/A #N/A #N/A 2,051
1912 #N/A #N/A #N/A 2,159
1913 #N/A #N/A #N/A 2,301
1914 #N/A #N/A #N/A 2,529
1915 1,727 1,727 1,767 2,887
1916 #N/A #N/A #N/A 3,767
1917 1,922 2,245 2,349 4,003
1918 2,452 2,745 2,934 4,766
1919 3,365 3,585 3,820 5,821
1920 4,027 4,234 4,439 7,396
1921 3,486 3,707 3,856 6,057
1922 3,083 3,309 3,399 5,406
1923 3,288 3,510 3,606 6,030
1924 3,563 3,770 3,886 6,566
1925 3,492 3,696 3,801 6,153
1926 3,107 3,329 3,416 5,529
1927 2,925 3,165 3,237 5,318
1928 2,942 3,187 3,257 5,437
1929 3,113 3,346 3,420 5,802
1930 3,159 3,387 3,463 5,705
1931 2,910 3,181 3,268 5,369
1932 2,611 2,917 3,006 5,112
1933 2,808 3,090 3,201 5,506
1934 3,095 3,342 3,446 5,967
1935 3,263 3,515 3,622 6,380
1936 3,391 3,640 3,770 6,690
1937 3,547 3,779 3,963 7,047










Table A3  – continued  
Income totals (Mill. DKK) 
  Reported income Assessed income Taxable income GFI
1939 4,243 4,243 4,478 7,942
1940 4,419 4,419 4,757 8,613
1941 5,089 5,089 5,505 9,736
1942 5,630 5,630 6,112 10,842
1943 6,386 6,386 6,958 12,346
1944 7,132 7,132 7,795 14,015
1945 7,757 7,757 8,567 14,049
1946 8,812 8,812 9,767 15,338
1947 9,340 9,340 10,407 16,891
1948 10,036 10,036 11,230 18,284
1949 10,621 10,621 11,936 19,413
1950 11,736 11,736 13,416 22,041
1951 12,417 12,417 14,508 24,128
1952 13,232 13,232 15,681 25,422
1953 13,860 13,860 16,498 26,785
1954 14,612 14,612 17,471 27,618
1955 15,266 15,266 18,413 28,706
1956 16,266 16,266 18,888 30,634
1957 16,918 16,918 19,719 32,668
1958 17,928 17,928 21,060 33,981
1959 19,553 19,553 23,237 37,435
1960 21,046 21,046 25,251 40,523
1961 24,005 24,005 29,399 45,375
1962 26,722 26,722 33,278 50,768
1963 28,731 28,731 36,146 53,476
1964 31,808 31,808 40,581 61,071
1965 35,514 35,514 46,120 68,291
1966 38,404 38,404 46,937 70,394
1967 54,890 #N/A 56,027 77,050
1968 60,731 #N/A 62,098 84,973
1969 #N/A #N/A #N/A 96,754
1970 75,351 #N/A 77,393 106,946
1971 84,339 #N/A 86,711 118,476
1972 94,025 #N/A 96,670 135,126
1973 107,670 #N/A 110,562 157,657
1974 124,506 #N/A 128,327 179,484
1975 143,596 #N/A 148,443 200,427
1976 161,931 #N/A 167,373 231,306
1977 179,727 #N/A 186,024 254,836
1978 199,352 #N/A 206,744 281,384
1979 220,068 #N/A 228,453 309,914
 
 






Table A3  – continued 
Income totals (Mill. DKK) 
  Reported income Assessed income Taxable income GFI
1980 241,137 #N/A 251,037 335,531
1981 261,908 #N/A 273,467 368,076
1982 296,532 #N/A 309,772 424,879
1983 324,826 #N/A 338,912 467,634
1984 346,348 #N/A 361,101 515,226
1985 370,616 #N/A 385,641 555,579
1986 393,118 #N/A 408,350 588,479
1987 421,212 #N/A 438,289 622,104
1988 445,106 #N/A 464,522 648,999
1989 465,060 #N/A 486,301 691,997
1990 481,199 #N/A 503,301 727,658
1991 500,079 #N/A 523,689 758,684
1992 519,176 #N/A 544,354 793,221
1993 529,333 #N/A 556,226 794,968
1994 571,395 #N/A 571,395 847,677
1995 590,743 #N/A 590,743 883,964
1996 611,057 #N/A 611,057 923,196
1997 626,907 #N/A 626,907 966,179
1998 652,734 #N/A 652,734 988,395
1999 681,952 #N/A 681,952 1,032,314
2000 692,150 #N/A 692,150 1,110,791
2001 722,084 #N/A 722,084 1,143,733
2002 743,178 #N/A 743,178 1,174,258
2003 763,349 #N/A 763,349 1,199,055
2004 783,156 #N/A 783,156 1,250,094
2005 808,131 #N/A 808,131 1,311,270
2006 838,057 #N/A 838,057 1,381,275
2007 866,676 #N/A 866,676 1,436,759
2008 885,725 #N/A 885,725 1,497,124
2009 888,854 #N/A 888,854 1,437,186
2010 952,302 #N/A 952,302 1,510,814
Notes:  The income concepts refer to the following: 
1) Reported income: The income total of the legal tax base from the DS tabulated income statistics and the mi-
cro-data from 1980. 
2) Assessed income: Reported income plus the DS’ estimates of the income below the cut-off of 800 DKK. 
From 1917-1937 the income below the cut-off has been estimated by Sørensen (1989). 
3) Taxable income: Before 1966, assessed income plus our own estimates of the allowance for ordinary state in-
come taxes (with effect from 1908). Before 1994 the taxable income series have further been adjusted for the 
grossing up of income transfers in 1994 as descripted below. 
Expressed as a percentage of Gross Factor Income given by Hansen (1974) (1870-1936) and DS (1937-2010).  
Sources: Statistics Denmark, Bjerke and Ussing (1957), Hansen (1974), Sørensen (1989) and own calculations. 
 
  








  Top 10 Top 5 Top 1 Top 0.1
1870 54.1 40.2 19.4 7.4
1900 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
1901 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
1902 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
1903 41.9 31.3 16.2 6.1
1904 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
1905 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
1906 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
1907 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
1908 42.4 31.7 16.5 6.3
1909 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
1910 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
1911 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
1912 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
1913 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
1914 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
1915 48.5 38.7 24.0 12.0
1916 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
1917 54.2 43.9 27.6 13.2
1918 53.3 42.9 26.1 11.6
1919 46.8 36.2 21.3 9.8
1920 41.1 29.9 15.3 6.1
1921 40.1 27.8 12.8 4.5
1922 40.0 27.9 12.8 4.1
1923 41.0 29.1 13.9 4.8
1924 40.8 29.0 13.8 4.8
1925 39.3 27.5 12.5 4.1
1926 38.7 26.8 12.1 3.8
1927 39.7 27.9 13.0 4.3
1928 40.1 28.3 13.3 4.4
1929 40.3 28.4 13.3 4.4
1930 40.0 28.3 13.3 4.3
1931 40.5 28.6 13.4 4.4
1932 41.2 29.0 13.5 4.4
1933 40.9 29.0 13.9 4.7
1934 40.9 29.3 14.4 4.9
1935 40.2 28.8 14.2 5.0
1936 40.3 29.0 14.4 5.1
1937 40.1 28.9 14.3 5.0










Table A4  – continued  
Income shares 
  Top 10 Top 5 Top 1 Top 0.1
1939 39.0 27.8 13.5 4.6
1940 39.0 28.0 13.8 4.9
1941 39.0 28.2 13.7 4.7
1942 38.4 27.6 13.4 4.4
1943 36.9 26.2 12.1 3.7
1944 36.1 25.3 11.2 3.3
1945 36.3 25.5 11.4 3.4
1946 34.1 23.6 10.6 3.4
1947 34.0 23.6 10.7 3.5
1948 32.7 22.3 9.9 3.1
1949 32.3 21.9 9.7 3.1
1950 32.2 21.5 9.4 3.0
1951 32.3 21.4 9.3 2.9
1952 32.2 21.2 9.0 2.8
1953 31.9 21.2 9.0 2.8
1954 31.3 20.8 8.7 2.6
1955 31.3 20.7 8.8 2.8
1956 31.7 21.3 9.0 2.8
1957 30.9 20.4 8.3 2.4
1958 31.3 20.7 8.6 2.6
1959 31.8 21.1 8.7 2.6
1960 31.8 21.2 8.6 2.6
1961 32.3 21.3 8.5 2.5
1962 32.5 21.3 8.5 2.4
1963 31.9 20.7 8.1 2.2
1964 31.3 20.2 7.9 2.2
1965 30.9 19.9 7.8 2.1
1966 31.2 20.4 7.8 2.0
1967 30.3 19.9 7.8 #N/A
1968 30.7 20.2 8.2 #N/A
1969 Change from family to individual taxation 
1970 33.3 22.3 9.2 #N/A
1971 32.3 21.2 8.2 2.2
1972 32.3 21.2 8.2 2.3
1973 32.0 20.9 #N/A #N/A
1974 30.6 19.6 7.3 1.9
1975 29.5 18.8 6.8 1.7
1976 29.1 18.4 6.6 #N/A
1977 27.9 17.5 6.1 1.5
1978 26.9 16.7 5.8 1.4
1979 26.4 16.3 5.6 1.4
 
 






Table A4  – continued 
Income shares 
  Top 10 Top 5 Top 1 Top 0.1
1980 25.9 15.9 5.5 1.4
1981 25.8 15.8 5.4 1.3
1982 25.3 15.4 5.2 1.3
1983 25.0 15.3 5.3 1.4
1984 24.7 15.2 5.3 1.4
1985 24.6 15.1 5.2 1.3
1986 24.5 15.0 5.2 1.3
1987 24.9 15.3 5.2 1.4
1988 25.1 15.4 5.2 1.3
1989 25.1 15.4 5.2 1.3
1990 25.1 15.4 5.2 1.3
1991 24.8 15.2 5.0 1.2
1992 24.9 15.2 5.0 1.2
1993 24.9 15.4 5.1 1.3
1994 24.6 15.1 5.0 1.2
1995 24.6 15.1 5.0 1.2
1996 24.7 15.2 5.1 1.2
1997 24.9 15.5 5.2 1.2
1998 25.1 15.7 5.4 1.3
1999 25.3 15.8 5.5 1.4
2000 25.7 16.2 5.7 1.5
2001 25.6 16.1 5.6 1.4
2002 25.5 16.0 5.5 1.4
2003 25.4 15.9 5.5 1.4
2004 25.4 16.0 5.6 1.4
2005 25.7 16.2 5.8 1.6
2006 25.7 16.3 5.9 1.7
2007 26.0 16.5 6.1 1.8
2008 26.2 16.6 6.1 1.7
2009 25.4 15.8 5.4 1.4
2010 26.9 17.2 6.4 1.9
Sources: Own calculations 
  






Appendix A3: Description of the micro data from 1980-2010 
Our analysis of the micro-data from 1980 and onwards is conducted on the server of the Kraka 
Foundation (www.kraka.org) managed by Statistics Denmark (DS)1. This server contains a number of 
rich register data sets organized by DS and from these we draw the yearly income data sets (indk) aug-
mented with the age variable from the family and population data sets (fabe). This age variable is meas-
ured at the beginning of the year, and we therefore add 1 in order to bring it in line with the age used 
by the tax authorities, which is measured at the end of the year. 
From these data sets we start by collecting the legal taxable income (DS variable: qsplindk) and le-
gal gross income defined as taxable income before deductions (brutto), which were the only definitions 
available in the tabulated data before 19802. These concepts are naturally affected by changes in the tax 
code and legislation more broadly, with the most important for this study since 1980 being: 
• From 1987 self-employed are able to retain profits in the company, so that these first enter 
taxable income at a later stage3. 
• In 1990 and especially in 1994 some formerly tax exempt transfers are raised and made tax-
able. 
• From 1991 stock income (capital gains and dividends) are taxed under a separate scheme 
and it no longer included in taxable income. 
• From 2000 imputed rents are taxed under a separate scheme and are no longer included in 
taxable income. 
It should further be kept in mind that capital gains in general were not included in both income 
concepts, as they were taxed under a special income scheme before 1993 and as stock income (together 
with dividends) hereafter.  
Of these changes it is only the grossing up of transfers in 1994 that seems to have a visible effect 
on the distributions of taxable and legal gross income. As shown in figure A1, the Gini coefficients for 
both concepts drop around 4 percentage points. The effect on the income share of the top 10 per cent 
is of an order of 1-1.5 percentage points.  
                                                 
1 A precise description of all variables is available at the DS homepage: 
www.dst.dk/da/TilSalg/Forskningsservice/Dokumentation.aspx. See also www.dst.dk/en/TilSalg/Forskningsservice.aspx. 
2 A consistent tabulation of legal gross income was not available in the tabulated data before 1977. 
3 While the 1987-reform also introduced the dual tax system, the definition of taxable income was not affected. The duality 
was achieved by introducing a new income concept consisting only of labour income and taxing this at an extra rate.  







The Gini coefficient and the top 10 per cent income share without the 1994 correction 
Notes:  Compared with the income shares used in the paper, the ones we use here have not been corrected for the 
grossing up of transfers in 1994. 
Sources: Statistics Denmark 
 
None of the other data breaks create visible breaks in the series. However we return to the issue 
of dividends (and capital gains) below. 
What is further evident from figure A1 is that there are no systematic differences in the devel-
opment in the inequality measures based on taxable and legal gross income4, which indicates that 
changes in deduction rules have not affected the distribution significantly. This gives us some confi-
dence in that inequality measured in taxable income also historically is a good proxy for the develop-
ment in gross income. 
DS have also computed a more standardized gross income concept (perindkialt), which is in prin-
ciple unaffected by the changes in tax code (i.e. what income types that are taxed). However given that 
reporting rules are often tied to the tax code, this income concept is indirectly affected. This is in par-
ticular true for stock income (dividends and capital gains), where the reporting to the tax authorities 
and thus DS have changes systematically since 1980. Furthermore, the development in the top income 
shares from this income concept closely follows those in figure A15, when we exclude stock income 
(aktieindk). 
One way of assessing the impact of stock income on the top income shares is to add aktieindk to 
the taxable income qsplindk from 1991 and onwards. This has been done in figure A2, which shows that 
the inclusion of stock income increases the top 10 per cent share from the beginning of the 1990s to 
2000 by around 1.5 percentage points. 
  
                                                 
4 This is also the case for the period 1977-1982, where the legal gross income is available in tabulated data. 
5 Before 1991 the variable aktieindk only contains dividends (from Danish companies), while non-tax exempt capital gains 
generally were placed in the residual income variable (resuink_gl) along with a range of other “hard-to-classify” income 
variables. Subtracting this variable from perindkialt along with aktieindk does not change the above conclusion. 







Total stock income and the top 10 per cent income share 
Notes:  Total stock income (aktieindk) is measured in per cent of taxable income + stock income (qsplindk + aktieindk). 
The series have been adjusted for the grossing up of transfers as description in section 2 in the paper. The same 
scaling factor has been used for both income totals. 
Sources: Statistics Denmark 
 
However, what is also evident from figure A2 is that this may simple reflect that changes in re-
porting rather the changes in the real income distribution. This is indicated by the fact that the total 
stock income reported to DS increases from almost nothing in the beginning of the period to around 2 
per cent of taxable income (plus stock income) from 2000 and onwards. This implies that, while the 
levels of inequality using stock income presumably are more accurately measured in the end of the pe-
riod, the increase over the period is likely to be exaggerated.  Figure A2 further gives a reason for why 
the removal of dividends from taxable income in 1991 did not create a visible break in the time series. 
The level of reported dividends was simply negligible. 
For the analysis of wealth-to-income shares in section 4 we have used reported wealth for the 
wealth taxation (form) until 1996, and the variable formrest_ny05 after the wealth tax were abolished. 
Among other things this imply that the value of certain consumer durables (such as cars) are excluded 
from the measure along with the firm equity for self-employed. 
 
  






Appendix A4: Upper and lower bounds on the income shares 
In the paper we focused solely on the income shares calculated by the mean split histogram 
method descripted in e.g. Atkinson (2005). This method assumes that the individual incomes within an 
interval increase linearly from the lower to the upper cut-off with a kink point at the average income in 
the interval. In this section we assess the uncertainty around this estimate by calculating the global (lin-
ear) upper and lower bounds by assuming that individuals within each interval either earns the interval 
mean (no within-equality) or is split in two groups earning the lower and upper income cut-off respec-
tively (maximum within-equality). 
The results of these calculations for the top 10 and top 1 per cent are shown in figure A3, from 
where it is evident that the uncertainty on the top 1 per cent throughout the whole period lies between 
+/- 0.5 percentage points. For the top 10 per cent the uncertainty is virtually zero before 1940, while it 
is more substantial in the 1940s and 50s with bounds going up to +/- 1 percentage point.  
Figure A3 
Deviations from the mean split interpolation of the income shares 
Sources: Own calculation 
 
From 1980 the shares are calculated using micro data and there is thus no interpolation uncer-
tainty in the estimates.  
 
	
